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THE PLEA BARGAIN IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
INTRODUCTION

A defendant's offer of a plea of guilty, in exchange for lenient
treatment by the prosecuting attorney, is commonly referred to as a
2
plea bargain.1 The practice of plea bargaining, in its myriad forms,
presently accounts for 90 percent of all criminal convictions.3 However, it was not until 1921, when a detailed statistical study of the
administration of criminal justice was completed, 4 that the widespread
use of plea bargaining and the decreasing role of jury trials in criminal convictions was discovered. 5 Prior to 1921, there were virtually
no records in existence in the United States to document the extent
to which plea bargaining was a factor in the administration of criminal
law.
A substantial quantity of legal literature has dissected and analyzed
the function of plea bargaining within its contemporary social and
constitutional context." Considerable emphasis has been placed on the
increasing volume of criminal prosecutions as the primary reason for
the prominence of plea bargaining.' Yet, graphs prepared from the
only significant data available for the preceding 80 years (1839-1926)
conclusively indicate that there was a uniformly high rate of conviction from guilty pleas in both rural and urban New York. s Furthermore, the absence of a substantial difference between the use of plea
bargaining both in sparsely populated rural counties and in New York
City illustrates the fallacy of ascribing the root causes of plea bargaining to crowded court calendars.
1. Gentile, Fair Bargains and Accurate Pleas, 49 B.U.L. REv. 514 (1969).
2. Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 So. CALIF. L. REV. 96, 103 (1928).
3. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 9 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S CosMSSION].

4. Moley, supra note 2, at 115.
5. Id. at 107.
6. See generally Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining,36 U. CHI. L.
REv. 50 (1968); Note, Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HAv. L. REv. 1387

(1970).
7. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 6, at 51. Note, The Role of Plea Negotiations
in Modern CriminalLaw, 46 CHI-KENT L. REv. 116 (1969).
8. Moley, supra note 2, at 107, 109.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

The prevalence of plea bargaining in 19th century New York
suggests that it can not be adequately understood solely by an analysis
of the current practice. Consequently, a study of the historical development of plea bargaining is necessary in order to demonstrate that
the bargain is not just an aberration of the proper administration of
criminal justice in the 20th century, but is instead a social and legal
phenomenon with ancient antecedents.
To contribute to that end, I will attempt to isolate the salient
forces and conditions within the criminal law that instigate bargaining, as well as the diametrically opposed forces that operate to prevent
any bargaining. An exploration of this ceaseless tension between the
rigidity of a structure embodied in custom or conceived by statute
and the attempt at flexibility through bargaining is the objective of
this paper.
I. THE OIUGINS
A. The Bargain in TribalSociety
The earliest view which we obtain of political society shows us in
each case the same system prevailing for the redress of wrongs and
punishment of offenses, namely, a system of private revenge and
personal redress of injuries. Each person avenged, in whatever manner he thought right, a wrong done him by another, and the customs of
the tribe sanctioned his doing so with impunity. The idea of retaliation is deeply rooted in man's nature. 9
A peculiar aspect of this "system of private revenge and personal
redress of injuries," which prevailed in tribal societies, was that it was
on the one hand a method of punishing a wrongdoer and therefore a
deterrent to harmful conduct, and on the other a virtual invitation
to corresponding acts of violence. It occupied the unique position of
being both a primitive solution to the problem of private injuries, and
at the same time, a prime cause of the protracted violence of the blood
feud. Moreover, there existed the potential for unrestrained brutality
by those applying the sanctions.
A method of limiting the potential severity implicit in a system
of private revenge was needed. The most fundamental way to restrict
9.

R.

CHERRY, LECTURES ON THE GROWTH OF CRIMINAL LAW IN ANCIENT COM-

MUNITIES 8 (1890)

[hereinafter cited as CHERRY].

500
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the devastating impact of this system would have been explicitly to
forbid private revenge. However, tribal customs were formulated by
an unconscious process, never enacted nor even enunciated, but developed over time by various authors. Therefore, unlike modern legislation, these customs could not be directly altered by fiat. In addition,
no central authority was present to monitor the transition. Yet, the
inflexible nature of the original system of private revenge necessitated
the creation of a more rational and functional mechanism to maintain
order and punish wrongdoers.' 0 Consequently, an alternative procedure became juxtaposed with the existing pattern of redress, thus permitting a choice of procedures and remedies.
The development began when an injured party exhibited a
willingness to accept a monetary payment as a substitute for his right
of revenge.'1 The wrongdoer thereby had an opportunity to avoid the
12
revenge he feared by offering a payment to the aggrieved party.
Initially, this option was completely voluntary and imposed no obligations on either party.13 At its inception, this alternate "bargaining"
procedure was protean, taking its character and shape from the adversaries.1 4
It lay entirely in the discretion of the injured person whether he would
accept pecuniary satisfaction or wreak his vengeance on the wrongdoer. And the latter, if he were strong enough, could safely defy his
enemy, and refuse to give any satisfaction. It was altogether a matter
of private bargaining; the injured man . . ., according to the fierce-

ness of his anger, exacting whatever sum he could from the wrongdoer.' 5

The virtues of the nascent bargaining process were appreciated by the
tribal societies, and a desire to substitute this method of redress for the
dreaded blood feud developed. Slowly, a more predictable pattern of
6
compensation was established.'
10. See J.

GOEBEL,

FELONY AND

ENGLISH CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

11.

MISDEMEANOR:

A

STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF

26 (1937).

CHERRY 10.

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. J. GOEBEL, supra note 10, at 29.
[This procedure was originally dominated by the will of the litigants; in short,
like modem arbitration between sovereign states, it was utter bargain procedure.
Each step ...
15.

CHERRY

16. See id.

depended upon consensual agreement ....
10.
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In tribal societies the bargaining process served to insulate the
wrongdoer from the harshness of the revenge to which he might otherwise have been subject. Also, as in the typical plea bargain, the accused would admit his guilt. His admission was not merely a legal
formality; it was the payment of the agreed compensation. Paying this
negotiated compensation was the reduced penalty which supplanted the
injured party's right to seek physical revenge. The coercive threat of
private revenge inherent in this system is illuminated by the old English proverb: "Buy off the spear or bear it."

17

This development in the mode of redress, from an accepted system vigorous in its sanctions and time-consuming in its operation,
to a flexible and expedient bargain method of dispute settlement
recurs throughout the development of societal controls.' 8 When the system of private revenge is replaced by a system of societal revenge, with
limits prescribed by a detailed criminal code of behavior and punishments, the ends bargained for will correspondingly change. Therefore,
when physical punishment, if utilized at all, takes the form of physical
confinement in prison, the bargain itself will no longer be forged by
brute force. Instead, the modem prosecutor will threaten the defendant
with a long term of years to secure a plea of guilty to a less serious
crime with an appreciably shorter sentence. 19 The defendant, eager to
reduce his potential liability, is receptive to the offer.2 0 In this manner the bargain procedure assumes its goals from the elements of
whatever system it is compromising.
B. Anglo-Saxon England: PrivateBargain to "Structured Bargain"
The earliest records of the Anglo-Saxons place them at the stage
of develoment where the right to pursue the blood feud was restricted. As Pollack and Maitland state:
In Alfred's day it was unlawful to begin a feud until an attempt had
been made to exact [a] sum.21
The system of bargain and compensation had been so successful that
17.

W. WINDEYER, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY
18. See p. 525 infra.
19.

17 (2d ed. rev. 1957).

PRESmENT'S COMMISSION 10-11.

20. Id.
21. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY
1968) [hereinafter cited as POLLOCk- & MAITLAND].

OF ENGLISH LAW

450-51 (2d ed.

COMMENTS

it was no longer an alternative means of redress; it became the accepted
and required mode of procedure.

22

Once established in the Anglo-Saxon community, the system's
amorphous contours began to attain some structure. To expedite its
functioning, a proper compensation payment was probably determined
by arbitration. 23 Later, a detailed table of suggested compromises was
established to aid the private bargainers to reach an agreement.24 In
this next stage
a scale of compensation [is] fixed by custom or enactment for death
or minor injuries, which may be graduated according to the rank of
the person injured. Such a scale may well exist for a time without
any positive duty of the kindred to accept the composition it offers.
It may serve only the purpose of saving disputes as to the proper
25
amount to be paid when the parties are disposed to make peace.
A continuing struggle between flexibility and structure was apparent. This conflict was manifested by the manner in which the bargain system was being consumed within the customary fram work of
control. Although the bargain was still being consummated directly
between the private parties, the burgeoning community interest in
peaceable settlement of private disputes led to promulgation of guidelines to enhance the prospects of a peaceful resolution of the' dispute.
Next, the early Anglo-Saxon sovereigns used their limited power
and authority to implement and enforce the operation of this formerly
optional system. 26 Ultimately, the option of pursuing the blood feud
rather than accepting the proffered composition payment was withdrawn, 27 and the bargain was codified.
The most striking passages of Aethelberht . . .are those which

consist of pre-ordained tariffs of payments which are deemed to be

"compensation" (bot) for various sorts of wrongs .... A great many
provisions... set out the compensation .... The list begins at C.33

and continues until C.72 with an astonishing catalogue of' the
various ways of causing grievous bodily harm .... [T]he appropriate
22. T. PLUCKNETT, EDWARD I AND CRIMNAL LAW
as PLUCKNETT].
23. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 46.

20 (1960) '[hereifiafter ;cited

24. Id.
25.

Id.

26. PLUCKNETT 20.
27. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND

-

46.
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sum of money is attached to every injury-"for each of the four first
teeth, six shillings; for each of the teeth which stand next to them,
4 shillings .. *"28

The progression thus far had been an evolution from the blood
feud, to purely private bargain and compensation, and then arbitration, followed by a standardized table of compensations. It appears that
even a primitive society is repelled by ad hoc private bargaining in a
penal system. This disfavor becomes more pronounced with the introduction of the state as a participant and merely ersatz victim.2 0 Nevertheless, 'even without those considerations, an originally formless bargain process had become rigidly structured. Part of the utility of the
bargain procedures had been its adaptability to the exigencies of the
occasion, developing remedies consistent with a particular injury.
It seems both logical and equitable to have attempted to devise the
proper compensation to be paid for an injury only after it had been
sustained.
When the private bargain became embodied in enactments, it
was no longer private and no longer negotiated. The bargain was
frozen into law" as statutory compensation supplanting the right to
seek private revenge. 31 The exact compensation to be paid for a multitude of injuries was pre-determined. Yet, the bargain cannot really be
said to have been completely eliminated, 82 for there was a "structured
bargain": a schedule of statutory compensations to correspond to particular injuries rather than a system of private vengeance. Modern
statutes, such as the Federal Kidnapping Acts are clearly descendants
28. PLUCKNBTr 11.
29. See p. 506 infra.
30. PLUCKNETT 16.
31. 1 PoLLocn & MAiTLAND 46.
32. But see id. Commenting on the Anglo-Saxons, Pollock and Maitland observed
that
[o]nly by degrees did the modem principles prevail, that the members of the
community must be content with remedies afforded them by law, and must not
seek private vengeance, and that, on the other hand, public offenses cannot
be remitted or compounded by private bargain.
Id. Perhaps on a theoretical level this statement is accurate; that is, confining its conclusions to principles. However, in terms of the practices that evolved, this statement is
suspect, since the bargain was never really eliminated.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce, any person
who has been unlawfully seized, confined, inveighed, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, or carried away . . . shall be punished (1) by death if the kidnapped
person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall
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of this conception. Under that statute, a defendant can avoid a possible death sentence by either waiving his right to a jury trial or by
entering a plea of guilty. 4 The concession or statutory bargain offered
to each accused, is his life in exchange for a jury waiver or guilty plea.
II.

ENGLAND AFTER THE

CONQUEgr

A. The State and the Bargain
The process of controlling the blood feud by bargain procedures
and then by an elaborate system of tariffs was an integral part in
the development of the Anglo-Saxon remedial system. 35 Yet, shortly
after the conquest by William in 1066, emerging legal procedures
would eradicate the traditional bargaining between private parties by
interjecting a third party interest, the Crown.3 6 From this point forward, the myriad and at times conflicting interests of the king, as an
individual, and the nation, as the medium of the judicial process, would
shape and alter the administration of justice.3 7 But it is also important
to note that moral and religious ideas contributed substantially to this
38
evolution in legal procedures.
To alter the prior legal and customary arrangements that existed
during the Anglo-Saxon period, the English sovereign needed a legal
39
principle to attack the old order, and the notion of the "King's Peace"
so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if
the death penalty is not imposed.
See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).

34. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 571 (1968).
35. See p. 503 supra.
36. PLUCKNETT 24.

It was the intrusion of the crown into the field of public affairs, and
especially the dogma that a crime was an offense against the state, that made
it possible for us to unlearn a valuable lesson which a thousand years ago
would never have been cast in doubt. Indeed, our earliest Anglo-Saxon laws
seem innocent of what would have seemed later an elementary distinction ...
it was left for Glanville to announce dogmatically "pleas are either criminal
or civil..

.

Id.
37. CHERRY 97.

38. See p. 507 infra.
39. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 47-49 (4th ed. 1936).

The idea is that a wrong, if committed within the area which can be said to be
under the protection of such a person, injures that person. It is an idea common to many primitive codes. To this idea we must look for one of the origins
of what will become, with the growth of royal justice, an environment as
necessary and as natural as the air we breathe-the King's Peace.
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was selected for this purpose. The "King's Peace" was a fiction devised
to serve as the rationale for the expansion of the King's dominion, as
well as the justification for usurping the jurisdiction of the local feudal
courts. Initially, the concept was limited to an actual invasion of the
King's rights. 40 However, as the legal practitioners gained more sophistication, they always alleged that there was a breach of the "King's
41
Peace", although, in fact, there may not have been any such violation.
It cannot be gainsaid that the technical injury to the state, in the
person of the King, is of a dubious character. Yet, the inclusion of this
third party into the judicial equation profoundly influenced the judicial process. In effect, any possibility of resolving a conflict between
the accused and the injured party by direct discussion and agreement
was threatened. Since the state had sustained no physical injury, it
42
found the process of conciliation foreign and offensive to its dignity.
The state, therefore, tended to be inflexible with its legislation designed
to apply to future conflicts and not necessarily suited to present ones.
When a law was actually broken, a disposition not wholly consistent
with that standard would, from the state's point of view, impugn its
authority. The state's injury thus was derived from the compromise
of the enforcement of its rule, rather than the actual breach of its
command. This pressure for conformity to the state's formula necessitated the development of an alternate procedure which could have
approached congruity with reality. "It was laid down by Bracton that
the King did not give wager of battle; and it was obviously still more
beneath his dignity to make a bargain for the life of a malefactor." 4
The words of Bracton signaled the demise of any overt system
of bargaining. The tone was one of moral rectitude, expressing personal and official resentment. The assertions Bracton made with certitude worked against the court's ability to incorporate supplementary
practices. For when the bargain procedure develops with knowledge of
judicial hostility to compromises, its settlements will be consummated
directly between the aggrieved party and the alleged wrongdoer without any participation or supervision by the court. Thus, by not acknowledging the necessity for some flexibility through bargaining, the court
sacrifices its control of the bargains.
40.
41.
42.
43.

CHERRY

94.

Id. at 96.
Id. at 98.
Id.
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B. Religious Ideas and the Bargain
Basic to the system of bargain and reparation, whether negotiated
by the parties or reduced to a structured bargain by enactment, was
the avoidance of severe physical sanctions. Initially, relief was sought
from private revenge and the blood feud. Now, there was a new threat
based on religious ideas from the East which were brought to England by the crusaders.
[T]he Oriental code of the Jewish laws, the laws of physical retaliation, the eye for an eye and the tooth for a tooth, law closely related to the hideous conception of hell fire, dominated the moral
sense of Western Europe, producing not only a distinction between acts of violence and breaches of social contract, but proposing physical penalties of horrible mutilation and death for the payments which among the Western peoples44had hitherto satisfied all
the wrongs and inconveniences of society.

What was formerly a bargain procedure and then a system of discounted penalties would assuredly be disfavored in such a retributive
climate. A flexible system of dispute settlement and compensation asserting boldly a relativist position, bending its contours to utilitarian
ends, stood as an affront to the emerging standards of justice. Sanctions premised upon ethical and moral evaluations of proper versus
deviant conduct permitted no discretion. Compromise of the legal
and moral standard was in essence a breach of a moral duty itself by
the guardians of the commands. Human compassion or administrative convenience could not be substituted for the law of the state.
The reasons for the rejection of bargained settlements were inherent in this growing demand for severe punishments related to degress of blameworthiness. Because of these pressures, the flexible
bargain procedure was excised from the accepted legal machinery. It
was viewed as a primitive artifact, a residue of a remedial system that
was not to be resurrected.
A combination of an inflexible system of redress with a potentially severe arsenal of punishments resulted in the same environment
that had earlier spawned the bargain procedure in tribal society. If
the pattern of development in tribal communities has any universal
validity, it suggests that bargain procedures would covertly modify the
impact of "royal" justice without necessitating a change in rhetoric.
44. J.

JEUDWINE, TORT, CRIME, AND POLICE IN MEDIEVAL BRITAIN

87 (1917).
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C. English Courtsand the Bargain
In the 15th and 16th centuries a decided escalation appeared in
the severity of punishments inflicted for crimes.4 As might be expected from our observations of the movement from private revenge to a system of compromises, alternate bargaining procedures
reemerged despite official reproach. A variety of compromises and
bargains functioned as an outlet for the trial system and a positive
force of justice and equity.
The English rule on agreements that interfere with criminal
prosecutions was
that an agreement to stifle a prosecution is unlawful, and the earliest
known variety of it goes back very far in the history of English
law. Theft-bote, or the re-taking of one's chattel from a thief in
order to favor and maintain him, was a heinous offense, and a
judicial decision46 was needed to settle that the punishment for it
was not capital.
Sir Stephen was in accord concerning the ancient offense of theft-bote,
but uncertain as to the modern laws on agreements in restraint of
misdemeanors. 47 He was, however, unable to determine if the agreements were illegal, void against public policy or permitted under specific circumstances. His confusion was justified in light of the meandering path taken by the courts in this area. 48 They struggled to reconcile
legal theory 'i rth actual practice; for as the gap widened, it could no
longer be intelligently ignored.
Logically, the bargains should either have been explained in terms
of the accepted practices, or condemned with indignation. However,
the courts proceeded along a middle path, developing a comprehensive set of somewhat contradictory rules in cases involving compromises of misdemeanors. 49 When dealing with matters of less gravity
than felony offenses, the courts were more open and receptive to
bargains. Instead of dogmatically applying legal rules, they examined
the particular circumstances surrounding the bargain. The courts
45.

J. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SocIrETY 86 (1935).

P. WNFELD, THE PRESENT LAw OF ABusE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE 117
(1921).
47. 1 J. STEPHEN, A ISTORY OF THE CRimINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 501-02 (1883).
48. P. WINFIELD, supra note 46, at 117, 128-30.
46.

49. Id.
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ultimately carved out an area within which they could feel comfortable
with a bargained settlement. The judicial rule-making process had
classified enough factors by 1844 for the court in Keir v. Leeman50
to formulate a standard:
The law will permit a compromise of all offenses though made the
subject of a criminal prosecution, for which offenses the injured
party might sue and recover the damage in action, this being the
only manner in which he can obtain redress. But if the offense be of
a public nature, no agreement can be valid that is founded on the
consideration of stifling a prosecution for it.r'
The distinction is significant in its implicit recognition that the injury
to the state in most cases is a fiction, and therefore the party actually
sustaining the injury should have some latitude in seeking redress.
However, such crimes as rioting or assaulting a public official clearly
involve sufficient state interest for the court to refuse to allow a
compromise. 52 The distinction is both logical and practical and represents a positive step from the traditional position's of Glanville and
Bracton. However, William Blackstone rejected even this niggardly
concession, saying, "[n]ay, even a voluntary forgiveness, by the party
injured, ought not in true policy intercept the stroke of justice."53
But anyone familiar with modern plea bargaining practice knows
that logical categories do not govern the market place. In the lower
courts every character of offense is subject to compromise by the
district attorney. The principles of reasoning and consistency dominate
the judges, while the lure of a high conviction rate dictates administrative policy and practice.54
D. Another "Structured Bargain"
The "privilegium clericale" or benefit of clergy, literally exempted
members of the clergy from the temporal justice of the state. 55 The
church reserved the prerogative to punish its own members in ecclesiastical courts. However, as circumstances developed at common-law,
50. 6 Q.B. 308 (1844).
51. P. WINFIELD, supranote 46, at 134.

52. Id.
53. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COmmENTARIES *364 [hereinafter cited as
54. A. TRAIN, THE PRISONER AT THE BAR 223 (1925).
55.

BLACKSTONE *365.

BLAcKSTONE]..
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this closely defined class of persons was to be materially expanded to
serve an additional function.
To fully comprehend this proliferation, it is necessary graphically to review the severity of the punishments that became the staple
of the criminal justice system. The previously discussed Eastern influences which followed the Crusades, adumbrated this trend. 0
Moreover, it seems to be well established that this increased severity
in punishment was not merely a statutory threat. The actual administration of the law was, judged by both earlier and later standards,
severe. Thus, it is believed that Henry VIII executed 72,000 offenders
during his reign. ... During the same reign boiling to death was
legalized by statutes passed in 1531.57
As a result of these barbarous practices there was a desperate necessity
for a means to avert or mitigate the effects. Having seen the system
of compensation and bargain that arose at an earlier time to moderate
the wrath of blood feuds we would anticipate that an alternate means
of procedure would be found58 in Tudor England.
The benefit of clergy could be asserted by the accused directly
after arraignment, confession, or conviction. 9 When it was accepted,
it served to remove the accused from the King's courts to an ecclesiastical trial.6 0 The reason the defendant would plead the benefit of
clergy was so that he could avail himself of the procedures utilized in
the courts of the church. The trials were conducted by compurgation
and routinely resulted in swift acquittals."' The potential for this
56. See p. 507 supra.
57. J. HALL, supra note 45, at 84-85.
58. See id. at 87. Many of the methods devised are not within the scope of this
paper, but it is important to note their existence in passing. They further illustrate
that whenever the official mode of procedure becomes too harsh, it fosters the growth
of counter practices to mitigate the severity of the law.
The juries made their contribution by bringing in verdicts which were palpably
not findings of fact, but deliberate misstatements of facts ....
The judges developed a long series of technicalities in which they effectively submerged
statutory provisions of capital penalization.
Id. at 87.
59. BLACKSTONE *366.
60. Id. at *368.
61. 2 POLLOCK & MArrLAND 443. The oldest of all modes of proof is compurgation
which hardly survived the Norman Conquest in criminal cases. Misuse by the accused
and empty appeals to the gods contributed to its demise. The method is explained by
Pollock and Maitland.
The swearer satisfies human justice by taking the oath. If he has sworn falsely,
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system to function as a buffer against the harsh secular tribunals was
obvious, and the category of persons entitled to assert the privilegium
clericale began to swell.
Originally the law held that no man should be admitted to the
privilege of clergy, but such as had the habitum et tonsuramclericalem.
But in the process of time a much wider and more comprehensive
criterion was established: every one that could read (a mark of
great learning in those days of ignorance and her sister superstition)

being accounted a clerk, and allowed benefit of clergy, though neither
initiated in holy orders, nor trimmed with the clerical tonsure. But
when learning, by means of invention of the printing press, and other

concurrent causes, began to be more generally disseminated then
formerly, it was found that
as many laymen as divine were admitted
62
to the privilegium clericale.

The benefit of clergy operated as a "structured bargain," analogous to
the scale of tariffs that were enacted in Anglo-Saxon times. By pleading the benefit of clergy, the accused received the benefit of the prearranged bargain: removal to the ecclesiastic courts in exchange for
his plea.
There has thus been a pattern of action and reaction. The parliamentary policy of harsh penalties for criminal offenders embodied in its
legislation had its real world consequences modified by a form of
plea bargaining. Initially the expansion of the bargain procedures was
tolerated, since their operations were limited in scope and maintained
a low profile. But it should be evident that eventually the authorities
would determine that the process of subversion had become too blatant.
When the overt functioning of the bargain mechanism began to have a
significant impact on the formal workings of the legitimate system,
pressure developed within parliament to create measures to curtail these
practices. In fact, the identical social and moral judgments that formed
he is exposed to the wrath of God . .. but in the meantime he has . ..

given

the requisite proof. In some rare cases a defendant was allowed to swear
away a charge by his own oath; usually what was required of him was an
oath supported by the oaths of oath-helpers.
2 id. at 600.

Ironically, this least-favored method of proof, considered undesirable in the 12th

and 13th centuries has not disappeared. Compurgation now exists in the guise of our
modem guilty plea which can be more accurately described as a "negative oath of
purgation. . . . Though a negative of the oath the plea is in all likelihood its lineal
descendant." H. SILvING, ESSAYS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 249 (1964).

62.

BLACKSTONE

*366-67.
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the backbone of the original legislation became the basis of an attempt
to destroy the practices that were diluting the royal mandate.03
III.

AMERICAN

DECISIONS: 1804-1927

"In theory there should be no compromises of criminal cases ....
In practice, however, the condonation and compromise of criminal
cases is frequent and the methods of evading the clear purpose of the
written law are varied." 64
This third part of the history of plea bargaining will review the
opinions of American appellate courts that were confronted directly
or indirectly by the plea bargaining process between 1804-1927. 05 The
views expressed by the American judges will reveal whether they have
adopted the English doctrines that were opposed to bargained compromises, or whether they have acknowledged plea bargaining as a
necessity and have shaped legal theory to reflect that reality. If the
decisions of the American courts exhibit disdain for most plea bargaining arrangements, the legislature might eventually be forced to reconcile legal theory and legal practice. The concluding section of this
paper will discuss that type of response. Unfortunately, the American
decisions on plea bargaining do not fall into a neat chronological pattern. For purpose of analysis, therefore, the opinions will be divided
into three groups: those against any compromise or inducement, those
giving tacit approval, and those affirming specific practices.
A. DecisionsForbiddingPleaBargaining
The earliest case in the United States which deals with the guilty
plea is Commonwealth v. Battis.66 Though technically reviewing a
guilty plea without mention of any bargaining, the court's sincere concern for the quality of the plea and the possibility that it might have
been tainted by either a confused or coerced defendant, clearly demonstrates a judicial attitude reminiscent of the policies enunciated by
Bracton and Glanville,6 7 an attitude which in principle banished bar63. Id. at *367. "[A]nd therefore by statute 4 Hem. VIII c.13, a distinction was
once more drawn between mere lay scholars and clerks that were really in orders." Id.
64. Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 So. CALIF. L. RzV. 1, 1-2 (1927).
65. See p. 499-500 supra.
66. 1 Mass. 94 (1804).
67. See p. 506 supra.
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gains from criminal proceedings. The court's deliberate and meticulous
investigation puts their opposition to compromises of the criminal
process by bargained pleas, beyond cavil and provides an example of
a determined effort to enforce a judicial ban on plea bargaining.
In the afternoon of the same day, the prisoner was again brought
to the bar, and the indictment for murder was once more read to

him. He again pleaded guilty. Upon which the Court examined,
under oath, the sheriff, the jailer, and the justice . . .as to the

sanity of the prisoner; and whether there had not been tampering
with him, either by promises, persuasion or hopes of pardon, if he
would plead guilty. On a very full inquiry, nothing of that kind was
appearing . . . the clerk was directed to record the plea on both

indictments. 68

The comprehensive nature of this court's review of the guilty plea
in the Battis case provides a vivid contrast to the cursory examinations
conducted or permitted by other courts. It is evident from the specific
questions asked by the court, that any inducements offered to secure
a guilty plea would be forbidden.
70
9
Two Michigan cases, Edwards v. People and People v. Lepper,
interpreted the same statute, 71 and can therefore be examined together.
The court in Edwards took judicial notice of the circumstances that
moved the state legislature of 1875 to action, especially the legislature's desire to prevent prosecutors from utilizing improper means
to procure guilty pleas.72 Next, the "public policy" doctrine, which
demands a clear showing of guilt,73 was cited by the court to supplement its reading of the statute. This doctrine specifically prohibits
68. 1 Mass. at 95 (emphasis in original).
69. 39 Mich. 760 (1878).
70. 51 Mich. 196, 16 N.W. 377 (1883).
71.
The statute referred to says: "That whenever any person shall plead guilty
to any information filed against him in any circuit court, it shall be the duty
of the judge of such court, before pronouncing judgment or sentence upon
such plea, to become satisfied, after such investigation as he may deem necessary for that purpose . ..that said plea was made freely, with full knowledge
of the nature of the accusation, and without undue influence. And whenever said judge shall have reasons to doubt the truth of such plea of guilty,
it shall be his duty to vacate the same, direct a plea of not guilty to be entered, and order a trial of the issue thus formed." Pub. Acts, 1875, p. 140.
Id. at 197, 16 N.W. at 377.
72. 39 Mich. at 762.
73. Id.
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bargaining for the substitution of some innocuous charge in place of
the original crime that led to the arrest of the accused.
The court's decision in Lepper, concerning the necessity to review pleas, espoused a policy similar to that evinced in Battis. This
policy can be characterized as an "affirmative action" program by the
court; that is, taking a detached and skeptical view of the guilty plea
and subjecting it to strict scrutiny. This procedure was implicit in the
Michigan statute, which was enacted to protect the rights of the prisoner
as well as the interests of the public. 7 4 Of paramount importance to the
court was preventing the acceptance of a guilty plea from a prisoner
who might otherwise have been vindicated at trial. To attain this end,
the Michigan court expected trial judges to protect the defendants by
freely exercising their discretionary powers to adjust any unfair results where any doubt existed as to the veracity or voluntariness of the
guilty plea. Lastly, as a precautionary measure to insulate their investigation from interference, the Edwards court suggested that the trial
judge should not rely on the prosecutor's statements concerning the
validity of a guilty plea, or even permit him to appear when the de75
fendant was questioned.
Following the rigid posture of the preceding decisions was
Saunders v. State in 1881.76 This case reflected the idea, prevalent when
the notion of the "King's Peace" was first postulated, that it is beneath
the dignity of the king or the state to bargain. Bargaining was thought
to be reserved exclusively for civil litigants. The opinion of the court
referred to the Code of Criminal Procedure for the proper standards
by which to judge the guilty plea. The statute clearly repudiated
bargained pleas, stating:
[N]o such plea shall be received unless it plainly appears that [the

defendant] is sane and is uninfluenced by any considerartion of fear,
by any persuasion or delusive hope of pardon, prompting him to
77
confess.

Despite this unambiguous statutory command, there remained
ways for a court to subvert its intent. However, in Saunders, the court
did not merely pay homage to the statute, honoring form over sub74.
75.
76.
77.

51 Mich. at 198, 16 N.W. at 377.
39 Mich. at 763.
10 Tex. Grim. 336 (1881).
Id. at 338.
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stance in order to allow the covert continuance of bargaining. It cited
Battis as an example of affirmative action without statutory directive,
and decided a fortiori that its burden was even higher. To accomplish its task the court rejected the "presumption of regularity" that
was routinely afforded officials performing their respective duties7 8 thus
permitting a careful examination of the actual circumstances that preceded the guilty plea.
Frequently a prosecutor makes promises that he cannot legally
guarantee, but which nevertheless induce the defendant to plead
guilty.7 9 It is precisely these arrangements that the courts in Meyers v.
State ° and Mounts v. Commonwealth l attack. The prosecutor may
promise to recommend leniency, or simply refrain from making any
recommendation-an action which sometimes will be a signal to a
trial judge familiar with customary practices. Technically, all is proper,
since the judge pronounces sentence on the crime for which the accused was arrested. But in fact, the prosecutor exerts an invisible control over the ultimate sentence.
In Meyers, the court boldly asserted a truism: "The agreement by
the prosecuting attorney was not sufficient to bar or cut off any right
of the state for the reason that the officer has no authority to bind
the state by such an agreement."8 2 Although the proposition is selfevident, the decision is significant because the court proceeded to admonish the prosecutor for his actions and allowed the misbegotten
guilty plea to be withdrawn. In addition, the court expressed its concern for defendants whose reliance on such promises would prove
detrimental should a judge later assert his independence in the sentencing process.
In a similar manner, the court in Mounts was worried about prosecutors who are imprudently zealous in their efforts to obtain convictions, and overreach the boundaries of propriety.8 3 The prosecutor's
offer of a lenient sentence to induce a plea of guilty presented the
court with a prima facie case that justified a withdrawal of the guilty
plea.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 339-40.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION 9.

115 Ind. 554, 18 N.E. 42 (1888).
89 Ky.274, 12 S.W. 311 (1889).
115 Ind. at 557, 18 N.E. at 43.
89 Ky.at 277, 12 S.W.at 311-12.
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A particular variety of plea bargaining is involved when a reduced plea is based upon extrinsic factors such as the need for the defendant to appear as a witness or give information about a more important suspect. Here, the state's offer of a reduced charge is contingent upon the defendant's performance in accordance with the plea
negotiation. An analagous arrangement occurs when the defendant
proposes a guilty plea, but joins that offer with a condition consistent
with his interest in a light sentence. For example, in the case of Cornelison v. Commonwealth, 4 the accused pleaded guilty with the intention of avoiding certain standard sentence recommendations by the
state prosecutor at the sentencing hearing. The Cornelison court repudiated the attempt to enter a plea "special in its character,"8 and required either a plea of not guilty or a guilty plea devoid of any
special conditions or limitations. The decision is consistent with the
ideal conception of criminal justice: impartial and uncompromising,
operating in conformity with statutory mandate and making exceptions
for no one.
A more sophisticated plea bargain was before the court in Wolfe
v. State.8 6 The condition upon which the guilty plea rested was "that
the court would impose a fine under the plea only in the event that
the defendant violated the terms of the agreement."8 Ts As in Cornelison,
the court could find no basis to accept this conditional plea of guilty.
To support its decision, the court declared: "[T]he law does not
authorize any such agreements as here entered into with the prosecuting attorney, and pleas of guilty can not be accepted on condition ...."88
Enforcement of the positions taken by these decisions required
the formulation of a strict standard of review, so that guilty pleas could
be effectively supervised by appellate courts. The court's opinion in
Scott v. State 9 proposed a comprehensive test:
[T]hat the defendant is sane, and he is uninfluenced in making his

plea by any consideration of fear, or by any persuasion, or delusive
hope of pardon, prompting him to confess his guilt .... Over and
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

84Ky. 583, 2 S.W. 235 (1886).
Id. at 592, 2 S.W. at 236.
102 Ark. 295, 144 S.W. 208 (1912).
Id. at 300, 144 S.W. at 210.
Id. at 301, 144 S.W. at 210.
29 Tex. App. 217, 15 S.W. 814 (1890).

516

COMMENTS
above the guilty plea the evidence, as we find it in the record, must

establish his guilt beyond all question .... 90
Thus in addition to the attempt to eliminate the bargained plea, the
Scott court exhibited an interest in protecting the integrity of the
guilty plea itself, by insisting upon, and closely observing the factual
basis of the plea.
The judicial philosophy expressed in these opinions exposing and
extinguishing the bargained plea was tersely articulated in Pope v.
State91 when the court stated that "[t]he law favors trials on the
merits."0 2 Also sustaining this position is People v. Bonheim 3 decided
in the 1920's when the first truly extensive documents and articles
appeared illustrating the ubiquitousness of plea bargaining in the
courts. 0 4 The court asserted that whenever any defense exists, or substantial justice requires a trial, the judge should allow the guilty plea
to be withdrawn. 9 Although the rigid position taken by the courts in
this section in opposition to plea bargaining conformed with the legal
doctrines inherited from England, it was at variance with the common
practice of the prosecuting attorneys. The dilemma presented by this
conflict between rules and reality was beyond the ability of the courts
to ameliorate, as the cases discussed in the next section indicate. Limited
by English precedent and American progeny, the courts could not
bridge the gap by judicial construction or interpretation.
B. DecisionsTacitly Approving PleaBargaining
In a corresponding span of years there was a second line of American cases faced with similar bargained compromises of the criminal
justice process. Instead of isolating the relevant issues and discussing
the conflicting policies, these decisions evaded, obscured or ignored
the pertinent questions. Employing diversionary tactics instead of analysis, these courts glossed over coercion, and substituted maxims for
reasoning. They were plainly caught between the demands of legal
theory and common prosecutorial practices, and valiantly attempted
to affirm the former, while not interfering with the latter.
90. Id. at 219, 15 S.W. at 815.

91. 56 Fla. 81,47 So. 487 (1908).
92. Id. at 85, 47 So. at 488.

93. 307 Ill. 316, 138 N.E. 627 (1923).
94. See, e.g., R. SMITHr, TuE CRIMINAL
95. 307 Ill. at 320, 138 N.E. at 628.

COURTS

13 (1921).
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The manner in which the court in People v. Brown90 viewed the
problem of coercion, a central element in the plea bargain, is symptomatic of positions taken by the opinions in this group. Confronted with
a situation in which a prisoner pleaded guilty following a conference
with the judge, the court summarily dismissed the probable effect of the
judge's remarks upon the defendant's decision. It blamed the defendant
and excused the trial judge's indiscretion: the trial judge was characterized as being "imprudent enough to intimate he would impose a
lighter sentence in case of conviction upon a plea" and the defendant
7
was reprimanded for his "importunities" in approaching the judge.0
These opinions demonstrate the propensity of the courts to articulate
lofty standards which are then emasculated when individual infractions
are declared to fall outside the perimeters of review, or are manipulated to appear consistent with professed policy.
Another well established means of protecting a bargained plea, is
to conduct a careful investigation in a manner assured to inhibit
complete candor. This technique was utilized and approved in Bayliss
v. People.98 To make its task less arduous, the court accepted a formulation of voluntariness that retreated from the absolute standards applied in Saunders thereby carving some room for a "fairly bargained
plea" that does not exert "undue influence" on the defendant. 9 To
enforce this elastic measuring rod, the court examined the accused in
open court with the prosecuting attorney and other court officers in attendance. In evaluating the effectiveness of this procedure, the court
declared that the presence of the prosecutor at the open court examination of the defendant was not sufficient grounds to invalidate the
plea.'0 0 Their conclusion is in marked contrast to the decision in Edwards, which determined that a meaningful conference with the defendant could only be attained by excluding the prosecuting attorney.
It seems that differing judgments concerning the proper status of a
bargaining plea are determinative in a court's approach to a dispute
over the validity of such plea. By diluting the standards applied to a
review of guilty pleas, the court tacitly approved the extensive use of
plea bargaining, and permitted the process to continue unhampered
by extensive judicial intervention.
96. 54Mich. 15, 19 N.W. 571 (1884).
97. Id. at 29, 19 N.W. at 579.
98. 46 Mich. 221, 9 N.W. 257 (1881).
99. Id. at 223, 9 N.W. at 257.
100. Id.
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A court seeking to avoid directly addressing the phenomenon of
the bargained plea, neither approving nor attacking its use or abuse,
is well supplied with legal maxims and presumptions that can be
adapted for that purpose. The courts in both People v. Ferguson'0 1
and People v. Coveyou 0 2 invoked a presumption of regularity to prevent a careful examination of a guilty plea. In each of these decisions
it is difficult to deduce whether there had been a bargain or the plea
was in fact voluntary and uninfluenced. All the officials involved in the
trial were lauded for their presumed performance and the lower court's
determination was upheld. A district attorney cognizant of this relaxed
judicial attitude would in the future have considerable latitude within
which to conduct his plea bargaining provided that he did not flaunt
his procedures and refrained from inordinate charge reductions certain to raise suspicion.
A less subtle means of achieving similar results would be simply
to review the factual circumstances, and then either deny that they are
as they appear, or transparently explain how influence or coercion
is not influence or coercion. This alternative was adopted in State v.
Reininghaus0 3 where the court was faced with a defendant who claimed
he had made an agreement with the district attorney to limit the possible fine to 50 dollars if he pleaded guilty. The testimony showed that
the prosecutor intimated there would be a nominal fine, and then the
defendant entered a guilty plea. In deciding whether the defendant
could withdraw his plea, the court characterized the district attorney's
statements as "a mere expression of opinion .

.

. upon which the de-

fendant had no right to rely, and by which the action of the court
cannot be governed."' 0 4 Only by ignoring the tremendous influence and
discretionary power of the prosecutor, as well as the omnipotent image
he displays to public, could the court minimize the significance of his
utterances. Anyone involved in the actual workings of the criminal
justice system would not so lightly dismiss the statements of a district
attorney. But secure in his position vis-h-vis the prosecutor, the judge
glibly expressed amazement at the defendant's naivet6.
Similarly, in State v. Wyckoff' 05 a defendant pleaded guilty based
on a prediction by the prosecutor that a minimum fine be imposed.
101. 48 Mich. 41, 11 N.W. 777 (1882).
102.., 48 Mich. 353, 12 N.W. 200 (1882).

103. 43 Iowa 149 (1876).
104. Id. at 151.
105. 107 N.W. 420 (Iowa 1906).
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The defendant sought to withdraw his plea when a substantial fine
was imposed instead. Rather than discussing the propriety of the bargain or the inducement, the court stated that the defendant was not
justified in believing that the judge would follow the prosecutor's
recommendation, because sentencing is within the legitimate discretion of the court. 10 6 As a consequence of this insubstantial review,
not only were plea negotiations unfettered, but the defendant could
become trapped: unable to withdraw what he thought to be a bargained plea he would be forced to accept whatever punishment the
court meted out. By not taking a decisive position, the courts permitted the pre-trial period to become a treacherous occasion for the
107
unwary.
This policy of equivocation by the judiciary only succeeds in masking serious questions, promoting deceitful practices by the district attorney and virtually leaving the defendant devoid of protection. Instead
of curtailing plea bargaining, or sanctioning its use and then openly supervising its operation, the courts in this second group of decisions opt
for a third alternative: they extend tacit approval to the arrangements
and deny any responsibility for the unfortunate results.
C. DecisionsApproving PleaBargaining
Having seen one series of judicial opinions that attempted to eliminate the plea bargain, and a second group embarrassed by plea bargains but equivocal, we will now review opinions which in part affirm
the propriety of the bargain procedure. Some of the cases struggle to
free themselves from earlier decisions that tended to limit the use
of bargain procedure; others create special justifications to support
its continued existence. In general, these courts focus upon the quality
of the bargain.
1. General Approval. In Green v. Commonwealth"8 counsel for
the defendant argued that "a man has no more right to waive his legal
privileges in a capital case than he has to commit suicide; for a plea
of guilty is suicide, committed under the color of law."' 109 Sixty years
after the decision in Battis, and in the same jurisdiction, a court might
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Accord, Beatty v. Roberts, 125 Iowa 619, 101 N.W. 462 (1904).
94 Mass. 155 (1866).
Id. at 158.
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be expected to accept this line of reasoning. However, the court in
Green cited the common law to justify an acceptance of a voluntary
plea of guilty for all crimes, thereby waiving a jury trial. It stressed
the right to plead guilty rather than the circumstances surrounding
the plea. By shifting its emphasis, the court was preparing a retreat
from the strict scrutiny practiced by the Massachusetts high court at
the beginning of the 19th century.
In a similar manner, the Indiana court in Monahan v. State'" desired to distinguish the facts before it from those in Meyers, decided
five years earlier. Although there was no trial on the merits, it determined that the defendant was "clearly guilty,""' and had not been
the victim of a "fraudulent inducement. ' ' 12 The court's purpose was
to narrow the holding in Meyers to its precise facts, and thereby avoid
interfering with pleas that had not been induced by a deceptive
promise. Since the earlier decision had criticized bargains by prosecutors which purported to predict the maximum sentence imposed
upon a guilty plea, the prosecutor would now be able to accept a plea
to a lesser charge. He would then be acting within his discretion, and
could be confident of the court's support.
This rapid change in position is curious, but a close reading of
the opinion reveals a factor that appears to have precipitated the reversal. The court opines that
if the defendants therein are displeased with the punishment, and
may, for slight cause or false claim, set aside the judgments, the only
final disposition of such cases will be trials upon pleas of not
11
guilty.
Clearly, the justices were worried about the burgeoning trial calendars and the ability to process the cases without the use of plea bargaining. They were fearful of the impact of the Meyers decision on the
administration of criminal justice at the trial level. In order to alleviate congestion, Monahan leaves the prosecutor free to influence the
defendant's plea with the official tools of his office, provided there is no
overt attempt to infringe upon the sentencing discretion of the trial
court after conviction on a plea.
110. 135 Ind. 216, 34N.E. 967 (1893).
111. Id. at 219,34 N.E. at 968.
112. Id.

113. Id.
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In addition to the courts which sought to unshackle themselves
from previous decisions, other tribunals not so encumbered directed
their attention towards the bargain. They wanted to assure themselves that the defendant received the benefit of his bargain. The expectations of the respective parties, rather than an inflexible conception of the trial as the only correct procedure, became the standard
tor appraising plea bargains.
Applying the philosophy of the economic market to the court1 14
room can be harsh, although it is expedient. In State v. Richardson,
the accused received unsympathetic treatment. After a brief conversation with the circuit attorney, the defendant agreed to a vaguely
worded offer. He accepted the dismissal of one count, and the attorney's
estimate concerning the sentence to be imposed on the second, but,
on pleading guilty, received a more severe sentence than he had anticipated. Ignoring the issue of inducement, the court proceeded to explain that a previous conviction should have alerted the defendant to
the hazards of plea negotiations. He was presumed to have known the
difference between an opinion and a promise and was left to make
this difficult legal distinction at his own peril. Thus a principle
analogous to "caveat emptor" was to replace judicial scrutiny.
An analogous situation came before the court in State v.
1 5 where the opinion relied upon was that of a special judge
Stephens,"
rather than a district attorney. The court exhibited more compassion
for the defendant whose rights were compromised by a broken promise,
and permitted the withdrawal of the plea. Since the defendant was
misled, the court felt constrained to act, attacking the lack of consideration for his plea of guilty, but not the plea bargain itself.
2. "Special Circumstances." Securing evidence about major crime
personalities is an onerous assignment, and virtually all the artillery
in the prosecutor's arsenal is needed to obtain indictments and convictions. An efficient technique is to offer a plea reduction to organized
crime underlings for information regarding their superiors. Courts
reviewing these bargains must consider plea bargaining on its merits,
balancing the assets and liabilities.
In Camron v. State, 16 the defendant supplied evidence against
his confederates. Instead of the anticipated dismissal of the charges
114. 98 Mo. 564, 12 S.W. 245 (1889).
115. 71 Mo. 535 (1880).
116. 32 Tex. Grim. 180, 22 S.W. 682 (1893).
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against him, the defendant was sentenced to two years of confinement.
On appeal the court examined the "Special circumstances"-the urgent
and persistent need for this type of information. It concluded that
"public policy" supported this type of agreement, and relied upon
17
contract principles to evaluate the bargain.
We have witnessed a progression from the close scrutiny of guilty
pleas, and the court's rejection of any compromise of bargain in Battis,
to a court justifying a particular bargain upon public policy grounds.
The very willingness of courts to weigh and balance the policies surrounding plea bargaining signalled a fundamental change in judicial
attitude. The obiter dictum in Camron gives an indication of the
extent of this change. In its concluding remarks, the court indicated
that it would be prepared to imply a binding agreement from the "mere
fact that an accomplice testifies as a witness for the government and
fully acknowledges his own participation in the offense."" 8
The defendant in People v. Bogolowski" 9 changed his plea to
guilty and provided essential testimony for the prosecution. The plea
bargain was consummated just prior to trial in the casual manner common to these arrangements, but the prosecutor did not keep his word.
Citing numerous authorities, including Wharton, Greenleaf and Camron, the court was able to find that "judicial necessity and public
policy"' 20 justified the bargain. Though not willing to reconstruct the
broken bargain, the court permitted the defendant to withdraw his
plea, establishing a precedent for the recognition of the plea bargain.
Another situation that can be termed "special" involves violations of the internal revenue laws. Here, rapid and efficient settlements
fill the treasury, and not the courts. Although there is admittedly a
criminal prosecution instituted against the tax evader, the suit is in
many ways akin to a civil action for debt, with the major difference
being the identity of the creditor. To provide flexibility, the rigid trial
structure must be abandoned.
In United States v. Bayaud,12 1 a federal court responded to this
pressing demand. The court reviewed a bargain initiated by the accused
117. Id. at 183, 22 S.W. at 683. "We think where the court sees the contract was
made and the defendant acted in perfect good faith, it should be recognized by the
court." Id.
118. Id.
119. 317 I1. 460, 148 N.E. 260 (1925).
120. Id. at 465, 148 N.E. at 261.
121. 23 F.721 (S.D.N.Y. 1883).
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and accepted by the district attorney. The plea bargain consisted of
the prosecutor's offer to drop two counts in consideration for the defendants' plea of guilty to another count, and his willingness to allow
122
the defendants to negotiate directly with the bureau in Washington.
When their prospects in Washington proved worthless, the defendants
attempted to withdraw their guilty plea. The court, refusing to sustain the motion to withdraw the plea referred to the pertinent statute
which encouraged the compromise of criminal cases brought by the
23
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Looking back across a spectrum of divergent opinions, the only
constant appears to be the presence of the plea bargain. Yet, it seems
that in a span of more than one hundred years only a few courts
could affirm an overtly bargained conviction, and those courts only
did so because of "special circumstances." The rhetoric of the legal
system had triumphed at the expense of the defendant who was forced
to confront the reality of the system which included plea bargains.
With the failure of the courts either to eliminate or satisfactorily control plea bargaining, only a carefully drafted legislative solution seems
workable.
CONCLUSION

Still Another "Structured Bargain"
Thieving is bad, say they, therefore, we will kill all the thieves.

This, no doubt, would be an effective remedy if carried out; but,
12 4
somehow it never was, and never could be, carried out.

Beginning with the most basic legal or quasi-legal system, the
system of private revenge common to all tribal societies, there seems
to have been a natural proclivity towards the creation of a bargain
procedure to mollify the strictures of customary law. The major thrust
of this evolution resulted from two defects inherent in the system of
private revenge. First, it could precipitate a chain of events stemming
122. Id.
123. Id. at 723. "The statute (Rev. St. § 3229) permits a compromise of criminal cases of this character to be made by the commissioner of internal revenue . ..

ld.
124. J. SPE CE, THE CONSCIENCE OF

THE
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from an initial injury without clearly definable limits, except as determined by the degree of animosity between the parties. Second, it
countenanced severe sanctions which were subject to no central authority, and therefore not limited by enforceable restrictions.
To mitigate the potential and actual severity of the penalties,
a system of private bargaining introduced the idea of monetary compensation for the aggrieved party in lieu of the traditional right of
revenge. The amount of compensation was a function of the anger of the
injured party and the wrongdoer's ability to pay. In addition, the consummation of the private bargain itself established that at a particular
moment a debt was literally paid, thereby circumscribing the cycle of
killings that had plagued primitive communities. In essence, this private compromise represented the definitive and timely decision which
is the necessary cornerstone of any legal system and provides the basis
for a civil society.
In a similar manner, the development of a comprehensive criminal law and elaborate procedural safeguards, both in England and
the United States, resulted in the same weaknesses characteristic of the
system of private revenge and personal redress of injuries. Crowded
court calendars delayed the rapid conclusion of prosecutions, while
legislative sanctions became more severe. These circumstances once
again created the conditions precedent to widespread resort to plea
bargaining.
Although the early American decisions exhibited judicial disdain
for plea bargaining, the New York legislature in 1974 should not cling
to the same dogma. Yet, as part of a package of tough drug control
legislation,'125 the State of New York in 1973 mounted a counter attack upon the seemingly inevitable practice of plea bargaining. Governor Rockefeller, after withdrawing his original proposal to eliminate
1 27
plea bargaining, 126 proposed a "limited form of plea bargaining."
The manifest intent of this legislation is to restrict the plea negotiations between the prosecutor and defendant by establishing the legal
125. NEvWSWEEK, Sept. 10, 1973, at 46.
126. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1973, § 1, at 24, col. 4.
The bill would . .. provide that a person who is convicted of selling . . .any
quantity of a narcotic drug ... shall be guilty of criminally selling a dangerous
drug in the first degree. Persons indicted for this crime would not be eligible
to plead guilty to a lesser offense ....

Id.
127. N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1973, § 1, at 1, col. 7 (city ed.).
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boundaries of the prosecutor's compromises. The amended statute requires that
[w]here the indictment charges one of the class A felonies defined
in .

.

. the penal law.., then any plea of guilty entered ...

128
include at least a plea of guilty of a class A felony.

must

In form, the New York law on plea bargaining is a type of "structured bargain" directly related to the Anglo-Saxon tariff system and
the practical operation of the benefit of clergy. However, in substance it
is materially different. Despite its rigidity, the Anglo-Saxon tariff
system embodied the monetary payments bargained for in order to
avert the suffering which attended private revenge. The structured
bargain had incorporated the compromises achieved through private
bargaining; the potentially severe sanctions were not reintroduced.
In an analogous manner the benefit of clergy had provided a clearly
defined procedure to circumvent the imposition of barbaric punishments devised in England. The historical development of plea bargaining therefore illustrates the role Draconian penalties have had
in instigating an alternate bargain procedure. However, this fact appears to have been ignored both by the Governor's rhetoric and his
critis' arguments. 120 While Governor Rockefeller retains a medieval
belief in the inflexible nature of statutory sanctions, his critics respond
by cataloging the administrative inconveniences that would result from
either eliminating or stultifying plea bargaining and fail to stress the
historical necessity of bargaining to demonstrate the futility of the
Governor's approach.' 30
Under the New York law, the plea bargain is utilized solely as a
means of maximizing the state's interest in harsh punishments. This
statutory structured bargain offers an illusory compromise, since even
a plea to an A-III felony can result in an eight-year minimum term of
imprisonment. 13 1 The problem with New York's structured bargain
128. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1973, ch. 276 § 23 (6) (a).
129. N.Y. Times, May 2, 1973, § 1, at 23, col. 1.

130. Id.
[C]ritics . . . have said it would severely aggravate Court congestion, favor
the major drug trafficker, and never prevent the police from turning defendants into informants, who offer the best means of getting behind the scenes
to major drug traffickers.
Id.
131. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1973, ch. 276 § 9 (3) (a) (iii).
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is that it responds too narrowly to society's illusion and politicians'
election conscious praise of uncompromising justice, 13 2 and gives insufficient attention to the reality of justice through compromise and
plea bargaining. The statutory threat of severe sanctions has historically created irresistible pressure for plea bargaining-independent of
the volume of criminal cases-which New York's structured bargain is
not flexible enough to accommodate. 8 33
Therefore, the only real question for the legislature is to determine how to insure the beneficial employment of plea bargaining.
Unless more reasonable sanctions and less stringent structural limits are
designed to confine the scope of plea bargaining, the pressures to compromise will be brought to bear on more vulnerable and less visible
stages of the criminal process. 134 The ubiquitous bargain procedure
remains an unavoidable by-product of our criminal justice system; an
intelligent legislative response must recognize its necessary societal
function.
JAY WISHINGRAD

132. See NEwsw E
133.

, Sept. 10, 1973, at 46.

N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1973, § 2, at 42, col. 6. "The consensus of more than

100 witnesses who testified on Governor Rockefeller's controversial penalties for narcotics offenses is that they are too rigid and severe ... ." Id.
134. See NEWSWEEK, Sept. 10, 1973, at 46.
[Governor Rockefeller's] plan may also be a corrupt-a-cop program; drug
traffickers now have more motivation to strike a deal with narcotics agents,
who in turn have more leverage to extort fatter bribes for not making an
arrest.
Id. See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1973, § 1, at 1, col. 4 (city ed.).
Only one-quarter as many felony drug arrests were made in the city in September-the first month under the state's new drug laws-as in the average
month of 1972, according to police statistics.
Id.

